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The effect of the present combination of policies has been to cut off the decline after four or five quarters. It hasn't brought a definitive recovery yet. In Britain the last quarter's figures still show a continuing decline, a small one, and we don't really know how vigorous the recovery will be. So there's still a lot to do.

What this shows is that, despite very substantial boosts to spending, when you get a shock like this, when the banking system implodes, you really are in a very deep hole, and it's very difficult to get out of it. And it would have tested all of even Keynes's ingenuity to know what the best method of escape is and what the restoration of normal levels of activity — that is trend rate of growth — would take.

TC: There are a couple of things there that I don't agree with. Robert is a great economic historian, so I should defer to you . . .

RS: But you won't!

TC: No, I won't. The first thing is that it's absolutely right that the problem in the 1930s was the banking system imploding. But I would say that you can interpret what happened in the 1930s very much in monetary terms, and that the problem, particularly in America, was the collapse in the quantity of money: a roughly 35-40 per cent collapse in the quantity of money, according to work done by [Milton] Friedman and [Anna] Schwartz in their great Monetary History of the United States. And actually, what turned things round wasn't fiscal policy, it was an aggressively expansionary monetary policy that became possible when America left the Gold Standard in 1933.

And if you look at the numbers you'll see that there was very rapid growth of US money from 1933 to 1936. The banking system had its problems and credit to the private sector was very weak. But the government borrowed on a vast scale from the banking system and created money. So this was a case of managing the currency to boost the economy in a recession, something I very much would have agreed with if I'd been there then. By the way, Keynes advocated similar things in the UK to those done in America, and I'm advocating a similar approach at the moment in this country. So that's one area of disagreement.

The second area is that you say governments are printing money. If you look at the numbers, monetary growth in the last nine months in America, the eurozone and Japan has been nil. There's been a bit of monetary growth here in the UK, but that's because of the specific policies — quantitative easing, targeted on the quantity of money — the Bank of England has been pursuing. This is so, so important. There is a huge debate at the moment about the relevance of both Keynes and Friedman and monetary economics. Where I disagree with you is that I believe that it's vital in these circumstances to emphasise the quantity of money and to argue for raising its growth rate. That's what really matters, not budgetary policy, not fiscal deficits. And there we disagree, I'm afraid, almost totally.

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Ralph Mugrave
October 23rd, 2010
12:10 PM
In your flax economy you say that printing money destroys “the value of the participants' cash balances”. So how come the monetary base of the U.S. increased by an astronomic and unprecedented amount 18 months ago, yet inflation is currently at record lows? As distinct from the above evidence, and moving on to the INTENTION behind money printing, the intention or objective is to bring sufficient extra demand to bring full employment, but not so much as to cause excess inflation. Also in your flax economy you make the very unrealistic assumption that there is only one final product, namely clothing, and that the market for this is saturated. But let’s run with that assumption. An economy where there are no consumers who want any more goods or services is an economy where there is no unemployment. That is there is no one who wants to work extra hours so as to consume more. No Keynsian with any common sense would advocate money printing (or any other method of increasing demand) in these circumstances.

Richard Allan
March 30th, 2010
12:03 AM
I'm an economics graduate from the LSE, and I don't understand why this article concentrates on those parts of "macroeconomics" which we only teach to first-year students, and abandon in embarassment by the end of even a three-year Bachelor's degree. The ideas being discussed in this article have absolutely no currency with the economists that I've known. The idea that printing money, or increasing consumption, can somehow increase wealth is ludicrous. Anyone constructing a theoretical economy in his head should be able to see this for himself. Printing money will discourage people from holding cash balances; this will INCREASE instability in the economy by leaving people more vulnerable to liquidity demands. Increasing consumption can only destroy accumulated wealth all the faster. Let's say we have an economy where one worker grows food, another flax, and a third weaves flax into linen. They each "hoard" cash in expectation of future spending requirements. Now suddenly the demand for linen and therefore flax drops off; perhaps the market for clothing has become saturated. What's the commonsense response? Telling the two textile workers to find new jobs. But this would cause "excess capacity" in the economy (the land would have to be ploughed under before it could grow anything else, and the sewing machines are worthless) and "unemployment", which Keynesians can't allow. So what's their solution? Print money, destroying the value of the participants' cash balances, and use it to "stimulate the demand" for textiles, presumably by buying the stuff up and burning it (as we all know occurred during the New Deal). This allows the textile workers to keep their jobs! But what happens to savers? Well, either they have to shrug their shoulders and eliminate their "real savings", leaving them vulnerable to "liquidity shocks" (like a sudden bout of illness rendering them unable to work), or they switch their cash savings for, well, REAL savings; ie. stored food. But assuming the economy is producing the maximum amount of food possible (at least until the flax land is repurposed, which we've decided to prevent for the sake of the textile industry), increasing the amount of "hoarded" food is surely worse for food consumption than any amount of "hoarded" cash. At least someone was eating the damn stuff beforehand! So if the farmer decides to stop saving, and is then laid low by illness, there will be a very sudden "panic" in the economy as textile workers scramble for food production. But if workers replace their cash savings with food savings, inflation won't work any more! You can't print food with which to buy clothes; and since the farmer doesn't want to trade food for clothes (he has enough already), and doesn't want to hold cash (loses its value too quickly), we'll end up with the textile industry collapsing either way! The only difference is that in the meantime, we forced people to make an undesired switch from cash savings to either "no savings" (more volatility in the economy as a result of unpredictable expenditures) or "real savings" (reducing the supply of real goods for consumption). The "fiscal" alternative is a similar Devil's bargain. Either take the farmer's food in taxes now, or borrow food from him, promising to tax him later to pay back his own debt (Ricardian Equivalence shows that these two are exactly similar in terms of effects). If the taxes cause him to scale back his production of food, then you've reduced real wealth in the economy. But if they don't, then surely the taxable proceeds would be better invested somewhere else than in a failing line of business? The same can be said if inflation somehow doesn't cause anyone to alter his cash balances; the concept of opportunity cost means that wasting money (and goods!) by putting them to bad use is just as bad as destroying them. The only way that printing money can increase wealth is if there is genuinely idle capital in the economy which could be devoted to the production of real value (ie. happiness), but for whatever reason, is not. However, the only plausible mechanism by which this capital could be put to work by printing money is if wages are "sticky downwards", so the workers are effectively refusing to work for a utility-maximising wage. But firstly, printing money to force down their real wages was a stupid idea in Keynes's time (where index-linked wage contracts were already becoming commonplace) and is an even more stupid idea nowadays. It will just not have the desired effect. And secondly, if workers refuse to work for a utility-maximising wage, this must be regarded as a voluntary decision on their part; and as a believer in the Harm Principle, I don't believe it's the government's role to reverse voluntary decisions (or "indecisions"). And thirdly, I find it far more likely that diverting any funds to government will be used to reward unproductive special interests than to match genuine demand with genuine excess capacity. In conclusion, I find that this entire article is based on a vision of economics that is (i) out of favour with the economics establishment, (ii) easily disprovable by thought-experiment to anyone capable of consecutive thought, and (iii) a mere attempt to justify government intervention in the economy for its own sake, and for the sake of increasing the "mystique" surrounding economics in order to justify an increase in economists' salaries. The fact that it has attracted no comments thus far is evidence that it has been treated by the readers with the confusion and indifference that it deserves; I simply couldn't allow it to go unchallenged myself.

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